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This article argues that it was through their common relationship to the commercial 
environment formed by the city that the independent lower middle classes were able 
to construct a collective identity.  The article examines these identities first in the 
context of a comparison between Rome and Milan, and then within the provincial 
towns of Lombardy.  It suggests that the concern of the petite bourgeoisie towards 
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residents.  The consequences of this are explored in a final section devoted to the 
immediate post-war era.   
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The Lower Middle Classes from Liberalism to Fascism. 
 
Jonathan Morris 
 
The collective identity of the lower middle classes was probably more closely tied to 
that of the city than that of any other social grouping during the industrial era.  This 
was especially true for the so-called petite bourgeoisie of self-employed small traders 
- manufacturers, retailers and service providers - on which this article will 
concentrate1.  The city formed the common location of these traders' businesses.  The 
raft of local regulations, restrictions and duties created the commercial environment in 
which they all traded.  It was through their common relationship to the city that this 
highly diverse grouping was able to construct a common identity.   
 In writing of ‘the city’ in this context I am thinking of the Italian term città 
which, of course, embraces many forms of urban settlement, from a small town to a 
large metropolis, and which usually corresponds to an administrative area or comune.  
Of course, different interests and identities might well exist between traders within 
fractions of a city, depending on the location and character of these, while it is equally 
possible to discern divisions between traders based on the nature and size of their 
businesses, or on cross-cutting identities such as those of origin or religion.  This 
article analyses the attempts of various journals and associations targeted at the petite 
bourgeoisie to construct identities that could span these divisions, and thereby 
mobilise traders into collective (usually political) activity in defence of what were 
presented as their common interests.  Such identities cannot simply be read as 
indicative of the position of the petite bourgeoisie, rather we need to question who 
proposed them, to what ends, and how they were received.  However in seeking to 
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shape the petit-bourgeois mindset, these constructions were also shaped by it, not least 
in terms of the language and logic through which they were expressed.   It is no 
accident that the city, in all its senses, was placed at the centre of discourses designed 
to furnish the petite bourgeoisie with a collective identity. 
The modernisation of the Italian economy began in the Liberal era as 
industrial manufacture serving a national market evolved from within the handicraft 
based regional economies, many still subject to elements of corporate-style regulation, 
that were formally joined together at unification.  Economic modernisation was, of 
course, paralleled by the transformation in Italy's political and administrative 
structures.  Petit-bourgeois identities therefore differed significantly between 
individual towns and cities depending on the functions and fortunes of these within 
the evolving Italian economy.   
This article explores these identities in two contexts.   First it contrasts the 
petit-bourgeois outlooks forged in Rome and Milan during the Liberal era, both key 
urban centres within the newly modernising Italy, but occupying very different roles 
within it.  A national capital primarily inhabited by public employees clearly 
constituted a very different environment from an industrial and commercial city in 
which the private sector predominated.    
The article then turns to examine the evolution of petit-bourgeois identities in 
the provincial towns of Lombardy, a region experiencing modernisation but in a 
selective manner with certain towns becoming linked to the national economy, while 
others were left isolated from it.  This conditioned the attitudes of the petite 
bourgeoisie towards their città and its administration, and can be seen to lie at the 
heart of a petit-bourgeois attitude to politics that privileged their own interests as 
traders, taxpayers and citizens over those of other residents.  The effects of this 
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identification with the city are explored in a final section devoted to the petite 
bourgeoisie in the immediate post-war era.   
 
Petit-bourgeois identities in Rome and Milan 
The two most prominent petit-bourgeois movements to develop in Liberal 
Italy were based in Milan and Rome.  The two were very different in their character, 
however, reflecting the contrasts between the commercial environments in these 
cities.  This could be seen in the different associational models adopted by the 
movements.  Whereas the leading Roman traders' association, the Societa` Generale 
fra Negozianti ed Industriali, embraced all forms and dimensions of private enterprise 
in the city, the Milanese Federazione Generale degli Esercenti was much more 
restrictive, confining itself to proprietors in the primary retailing and service trades 
such as butchers, bakers and trattoria owners.   It refused to have much to do with 
large-scale entrepreneurs, and effectively excluded proprietors of productive 
enterprises.  
 The difference in the membership and aspirations of the two organisations 
was captured by the language employed in their titles: negozianti, like commercianti, 
was a term that implied mercantile activity, but could be stretched to embrace all 
types of commercial enterprise from shopkeeper to large scale trader; whereas 
esercenti - perhaps best rendered as practitioner, was clearly understood to denote a 
small proprietor in contradistinction to a large one, such as when it appeared in the 
titles of local and national organisations for industriali, commercianti ed esercenti.   
 The restricted appeal of the Milanese Federation can be dated back to its 
origins as a defensive organisation for suburban retailers i.e. those who were located 
outside the city walls in the so-called corpi santi2.  The duty charged on all retail 
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goods known as the dazio consumo was applied with different tariffs and collected 
with different methods in the two zones, with the result that suburban shopkeepers 
were able to sell goods at lower prices and thus win the custom not only of suburban 
residents, but also of a significant number of the lower class inhabitants of the city 
centre who would cross into the suburbs to buy their provisions.  The number of shops 
that sprang up alongside the city walls was testimony to this. 
In the latter 1880s attempts were made to reduce the amount of 'duty-free' 
goods that customers could take back through the walls into the centre, notably the 
bread rolls known as micca which were taken in as lunch by workers from the 
suburbs.  By the mid-1890s, the need for more revenue led the Milanese municipality 
to begin a campaign to extend the dazio belt to the entirety of the city.   Both 
proposals provoked predictable protests from those suburban proprietors whose 
interests would inevitably be harmed, as well as the approval of city centre traders 
who felt they were disadvantaged.   
During these years, then, traders’ collective identities were not constructed in 
relationship to the city, but to the fraction of this that they inhabited.  Although the 
Federazione degli Esercenti was theoretically open to shopkeepers on both sides of 
this spatial divide, its early existence was dominated by the fight to retain the existing 
dazio system, and it drew its main support from those suburban retailers who 
benefited from this.  As the dazio issue was only of interest to retailers selling directly 
into the public market, there was no reason for the Federation to extend membership 
beyond this restricted stratum.   Political and social solidarities were also a product of 
this division with suburban shopkeepers proclaiming their empathy with their lower 
class customers, while the Federation endorsed the electoral lists of the predominantly 
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suburban ‘democratic’ political associations that challenged the hegemony of the 
‘moderate’ elite whose core constituency came from the city centre.  
 In Rome, by contrast, there was no significant dazio division to divide traders, 
and the initiative to found the Società Generale fra Negozianti ed Industriali in 1892 
appears to have been based upon a desire to mobilise the broader commercial sector, 
which, following the franchise extensions of the later 1880s, had assumed a new 
importance in the political arena.  Until this point commercial associations had been 
restricted to an elite set of interests.  By adopting the format of a ‘mixed’ society – 
both in terms of the inclusion of both manufacturing and commerce, and with regard 
to the size of the operations included within the society’s remit, the organisers of the 
Società Generale were able to incorporate the petite bourgeoisie into their 
constituency, thus maximising the numerical (and hence political) weight of the 
commercial interest in a city dominated by the public sector.  This was an attempt to 
construct a much broader and inclusive identity with activity directed towards 
defending the common interests of all commercial enterprise within the city.  One of 
the Società Generale’s first campaigns, for example, was to contest the manner in 
which the Comune (local authority) determined the incomes upon which the tassa di 
richezza mobile (income tax) was imposed, resulting in the inclusion of business 
representatives in the commissions that determined this 3.  
The distinctive feature of the Roman commercial environment was that the 
city’s population, and hence its retail market, was dominated by public employees - 
mostly civil servants or members of the military.  There was little in the way of 
industrial development, with the most buoyant sectors being those of construction and 
finance - the one financing the building of housing and offices by the other.  While 
the years following the transfer of the capital resulted in a property boom from the 
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expansion of the state, this turned into a speculative bubble that collapsed with 
disastrous results in the 1880s, leading to social tensions that exploded in March 1888 
when unemployed building workers stormed the shops and bakeries of the city.  
According to a pamphleteer writing in 1889 on behalf of the city's 
shopkeepers, as many workers had now left the city, traders were even more reliant on 
the custom of those civil servants who remained.  So, when these groups began 
forming consumer cooperatives amongst themselves, this threatened the very 
existence of traders who had no other customers to whom to turn because of Rome's 
particular characteristics.  This moved him to ask: 
 
Is it beautiful, is it humane, is it equitable, the operation of the cooperatives?  The 
protests and cries of pain from those who are damaged are but the consequence of the 
new economic and commercial order installed in Rome, a city noted for lacking 
industrial establishments that attract workers and resident consumers in from other 
cities, and in which - could one say - small commerce is almost exclusively sustained 
by the impiegati (clerks) and military personnel4? 
 
What is striking is that this lament about cooperatives becomes part of an 
attack on the operation of the free market per se; indeed the appearance of these 
institutions is presented as the consequence of the adoption of the new canon of 
‘freedom of trade’ which means that 'anyone can set up as a wholesaler or retailer and 
not only deal in any products he wants, but at any price he chooses as well'5.  We 
cannot be certain whether this was a deeply rooted conviction amongst Roman traders 
of the time, or just an embellishment of their case by the lawyer who wrote the 
pamphlet on their behalf - but it is surely likely that those who commissioned the 
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pamphlet would have approved its contents.  If so, this call for a re-regulation of the 
market, would have put Roman traders in opposition not just to economic 
modernisation, but to the very political project that had transformed their city. 
 The campaigns against military and civil service consumer cooperatives 
continued to dominate the activity of the Società Generale fra Negozianti ed 
Industriali in Rome during the decades prior to the First World War.  In particular, it 
highlighted the effect of the protection granted to state employees through the law on 
the 'non-sequestration of stipends’ that allowed for a fifth of public sector salaries to 
be paid directly into cooperative credit institutions.  As well as preventing this money 
reaching the hands of private traders (including any to whom the civil servant was 
indebted), these accounts were frequently linked to consumer cooperatives that the 
individual then patronised.  This was the system employed by Unione Militare, the 
equivalent of the British 'Army and Navy ' stores, for example, which was particularly 
resented by retailers because it had been granted both start-up funding and a 
privileged position as a supplier of uniforms by the Ministry of War.  Based in Rome, 
it became the largest national consumer cooperative with around thirty branches 
throughout Italy and its colonial outposts by the early 1920s6.   
  Given that the benefits extended to civil service cooperatives could only be 
resolved by the repeal of measures at parliamentary level, the Società Generale sought 
to extend its field of reference from the local political arena to the national one.  It 
organised a series of national campaigns against these cooperatives, reaching out to 
other trader’s associations that had sprung up in different cities across the country 
following the stimulus of the franchise reforms.  The highpoint of this was a series of 
demonstrations and petitions presented to parliament in 1900 and 19027.    
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 Reporting these events, however, the Milan shopkeeper newspaper, 
L'Esercente, dismissed the complaints against the cooperatives as 'unimportant trifles' 
while the Federation notably failed to sign the anti-cooperative petition8.  To 
understand this contrast we have to remember that Milan's position as a rapidly 
expanding commercial and manufacturing centre meant that its population was 
primarily composed of workers in the private sector.  The leading cooperatives were 
those catering to private sector white-collar employees: the Unione Cooperativa, for 
example, was founded by the Associazione Generale fra gl'Impiegati Civili in 1886. 
This became the most important retailing operation in the city developing a 
widespread network of branches which sold to the public as well as to members, yet it 
never penetrated the working class markets which remained the preserve of private 
shopkeepers.  This was because shopkeepers alone were prepared to use their local 
neighbourhood knowledge to grant their customers credit - something cooperatives 
either refused to do on principle, (as was the case at the Unione), or were unable to 
accomplish in practice (the cause of the demise of most working class cooperatives)9. 
 Consequently, although L’Esercente attacked the so-called 'privileges' of 
consumer cooperatives catering to these sectors, both it and the Federazione were 
quick to disavow any desire for controls over the market or protection from 
competition.  As an article in L'Esercente of 1892 explained: 
 
We desire equality of treatment.  With every privilege abolished petty commerce will 
willingly endeavour to struggle with the cooperatives, certain of beating them -  
private initiative, activity and intelligence being worth much more than any big 
bureaucratic mechanism10. 
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The contrast between the faith in the free market expressed by the Milan newspaper 
and the doubts raised by the Rome pamphleteer three years previously is striking. 
 During the 1890s the two cooperative 'privileges' which had attracted the ire of 
the Milanese movement both disappeared.  White-collar cooperatives, which operated 
the dividend system, had refused to pay tax on that portion of their income that they 
returned to their members, but in 1895 the obligation to do so was established at law.   
Three years later, when the Milanese dazio boundary was extended to include the 
corpi santi, this eliminated the exemption enjoyed by cooperatives set up 'for the 
needy' located there, striking a further blow against working class cooperation.  By 
1902, therefore, according to L'Esercente, the protests centred in Rome aroused 'total 
indifference' amongst traders in the Lombard capital11.  
This indifference was reflected in the lack of interest shown by the Milanese 
Federazione in participating in attempts to construct a national interest organisation 
for traders in the 1900s in which the Roman Società played a leading role.  In 1903 it 
combined with the Associazione commerciale industriale agricola romana – an 
association with a much more elitist membership - to host a conference of industrial 
and commercial associations from across the country that set up a Comitato 
permanente pro industria e commercio in 1903 which was transformed into the 
Confederazione commerciale ed industriale italiana in 1906.  Once more, then, the 
Società involved itself in the construction of broad social and national alliances in 
order to pursue its aims.  Conversely the Milanese Federazione regarded mixed 
organisations as diluting the identity and independence of the petite bourgeoisie.   Its 
suspicions were fuelled by the activities of the rival Associazione fra Commercianti, 
Industriali ed Esercenti led by the chemical manufacturer Ettore Candiani which, 
though claiming to speak for all forms of enterprise, essentially articulated the 
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interests of larger scale operations in the city.  It was Candiani who became the 
leading Milanese figure in the Confederazione commerciale ed industriale italiana12.    
These contrasts between Rome and Milan can only be understood in terms of 
the different functions of the cities, and the commercial environment created within 
them.  The Roman position was conditioned by the fact that the state protected both 
consumers and cooperatives within the city through the law against sequestration that 
delivered one to the other.  In a city dominated by public service, there was no other 
market sector large enough to support private traders.  To assert traders’ interests it 
was necessary to create as broad an alliance within the business community as 
possible, and to extend this to the national level in order to contest the privileges 
granted by parliament to the cooperative sector. Although the Società Generale did 
not speak purely for the petite bourgeoisie, therefore, it proposed a collective identity 
for all traders within the city and a strategy through which to pursue their interests.    
Conversely the industrial and commercial character of Milan was crucial in 
reducing the threat of cooperatives, and explains why the city's traders believed they 
could be beaten through competition, rather than regulation.   The particular issues 
surrounding the dazio belt were particular to Milan, while the cooperatives attempts to 
avoid tax on the dividend were addressed through the appeal court rather than 
parliament.  Hence the Federazione’s social isolationism was overlaid by its localism, 
reflecting its sense that the context of the city, like that of the petit-bourgeois stratum, 
was unique.   
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 The Petite Bourgeoisie and the City in Provincial Lombardy 
 
Examining the case of the petite bourgeoisie in provincial towns in Lombardy 
presents us with another opportunity to explore the extent to which the city acted as a 
collective focus through which lower middle class identities could be constructed. 
This section analyses this process through an examination of the publications linked 
to various forms of traders’ associations that appeared during the Liberal period13.  It 
highlights the attitudes towards the phenomenon of economic modernisation 
developed amongst the petite bourgeoisie in those towns whose position left them at 
the edge of the phenomenon, rather than its centre.  This will enable us to move 
beyond the usual discussion of the connections between the lower middle classes, 
anti-Modernism, and Fascism, to attempt to construct an interpretation of events in the 
post-war era as deriving from the ways in which the petit-bourgeoisie thought about 
the city itself. 
 The scope for collective activity amongst the petite bourgeoisie in the 
nineteenth century was restricted. In Lombardy the guild system had been in decline 
for several centuries prior to its formal abolition under Joseph II in 1786 with most 
regulatory powers having long passed from corporations to the local comune14.   
Consequently there was no call for the creation of self-regulating trade associations 
while proprietors had little need for syndical activities given that only a small 
proportion employed workers, and negotiations between employer and employee were 
usually conducted on an individual basis.  This left little opportunity for 
associationism beyond the friendly societies that appeared amongst some proprietors 
in the more secure trades, such as butchery and bakery. 
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There was, however, one interest that all small proprietors shared, and that 
was in the locality in which they traded.  Within the city this was experienced at the 
level of the neighbourhood in which the enterprise was located and from which it 
drew its clientele.  Here individual traders were in constant competition against each 
other, with their nearest neighbours representing their greatest threat.   At the level of 
the city, however, all traders had to operate within the commercial environment of 
regulations and duties that were either imposed or implemented by the local comune.  
As one publication put it: 
 
Each of us has continuous, multiple relationships with the Comune; the proprietor 
whose ways of trading are regulated by municipal decree has them and the taxpayer of 
every class has them because it is the municipal commissions that decide on the tax 
rates15. 
 
These twin identities as traders and taxpayers in the municipality straddled the whole 
gamut of economic activity, thus helping to foster a petit-bourgeois identity, as 
distinct from a trade or craft-based one.  
These twin forms of identity were combined in the first forms of collective 
organisation amongst the Lombard petit-bourgeoisie to extend their reach beyond 
individual trades - the consortia (consorzi) set up amongst traders to collect the dazio 
consumo.  In the provincial towns this tax was usually farmed out for collection by a 
private contractor who therefore had every incentive to impose as high a rate as 
possible amongst the contributors.  In 1884, the bulletin of the Monza consorzio 
claimed that the actions of a 'discreet number of esercenti' had demonstrated once and 
for all that by uniting in a 'collegial, fraternal association', to pay their taxes to the 
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Comune, one could avoid falling into the hands of 'a stranger who had himself 
designated as collector in order to take many more coins out of our pockets for the 
profits he wished to make!'16  Instead the consorzio promised that it would come to 
accords with each type of trader using 'neither airy or personal criteria, but practical 
and reasonable ones'17. Nonetheless there is evidence from other consorzi that the 
better-off traders who set them up lightened their own burden at the expense of their 
weaker colleagues: in Gallarate, where a consorzio was set up in 1864, the 
pizzicagnoli (vendors of oils and diary products) successfully protested against the 
duties levied on them by the six salsamentari (pork butchers) who held the contract 
for collection18. 
 The stimulus to move to other forms of activity was provided by the expansion 
of the local electorate following the franchise reforms of 1888 that lowered the 
taxable income qualification, thus enfranchising many members of the petite 
bourgeoisie.  Small traders now had the chance to influence the conduct of the 
Comune, either via their own efforts, or by working in conjunction with other social 
actors who needed to court their votes.  In Varese, for example, where the number of 
those entitled to vote rose from 1,068 to 2,060 out of a population of just over 14,000, 
the 1889 elections saw the first electoral banner to be hung up in the town appearing 
under the main archway, appealing to shopkeepers to defend their interests against 
rising local taxes19. 
 Alongside the vote itself, the better-off traders had acquired admittance into 
other representative public institutions, such as the Chambers of Commerce. In the 
1890s new, permanent organisations were set up to appeal to this constituency in 
towns such as Brescia, Como, Pavia and Cremona.  Although the names of these 
associations sometimes only mentioned commercianti and industriali, they were, 
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nonetheless, keen to recruit the newly enfranchised members of the petite bourgeoisie 
who were being encouraged to regard themselves as part of the broader 
entrepreneurial class within the city, and, as such, as commercianti or industriali 
themselves.  In 1897 an Associazione fra commercianti and industriali with 200 
members appeared in Varese. Its statutes, though, declared its aim was that of 
'procuring for the class of esercenti, representatives in the town council who will 
know how to protect their interests'20.   It was necessary that all commercial elements 
felt equally represented within these institutions if they were to function effectively as 
pressure groups. The Associazione commerciale industriale agricolo of Pavia, for 
example, paid little attention to small traders in its journal, except to lament their 
understandable failure to turn out and vote for Associazione endorsed candidates in 
the 1891 elections21.  
 The issues around which small traders could be mobilised were those 
concerning the commercial environment of the city.  In particular, they were 
concerned that their town should benefit from the economic transformation taking 
place within the region.  Above all this meant being connected to the key agent for the 
transmission of modernisation - the train and tram networks.  The Monza consorzio 
criticised the council in 1885 for 'not having competed, either morally or materially' to 
make the city a hub on which train and tram routes in the region converged22.  In 
1910, the Cremona Federazione di Commercianti ed Industriali, speaking for its 550 
members, claimed: 
 
We want the introduction of electric trams, we want the railway 
question resolved, we want covered markets for the contraction of 
all business, we want all necessary services provided to the suburbs 
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giving this part of the city that which it has the right to expect. (bold 
text as in original)23
 
While the typical member pays up (i.e. his municipal taxes) ‘he wants, he demands, 
with reason, the means to earn’24.  
 Implementing this programme required investment in the city.  This was 
usually the cause of conflicts between liberal, democratic forces within local politics 
who favoured this approach, and conservative moderate ones that were inclined to 
oppose it. The conservative forces justified their position by arguing that railways 
might actually bring the dark, destructive, side of modernity into the town.  In 
Brescia, the clerico-moderate paper, Il Cittadino, observed that it was: 
 
a fact demonstrated by the crudest statistics that the railways had displaced the centre 
of commercial activity of entire provinces, actually ruining small commerce and 
extinguishing the traffic that in the past had rendered medium-sized towns 
prosperous25. 
 
The moderates therefore proposed building a (much cheaper) network of 
steam-powered trams to link up local centres while remaining outside the national rail 
system.  This argument held no appeal for the Brescian urban petite bourgeoisie, 
however, who formed a key element of the democratic power base constructed by 
Zanardelli in the city, around the promotion of prosperity through railway building. 
The petite bourgeoisie in Lombardy did not reject modernisation: indeed they actively 
sought it.  
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We should not over-identify the petite bourgeoisie with a particular political 
grouping, however. They saw their identity not in political but occupational terms. 
Consequently they acted autonomously from political parties, favouring candidates on 
the basis of their occupation rather than affiliation. Traders’ organisations frequently 
recommended a list of candidates featuring names chosen from several different 
formations.  At the 1897 elections in Varese, two of the four candidates proposed by 
the Associazione fra i commercianti e gli industriali were elected to the town council - 
one was a Moderate, one a Democrat, while all four proposed candidates were carried 
on the Clerical list26.  
Petit-bourgeois electors were equally inclined to reject lists supposed to 
represent their interests if they felt occupational criteria had been ignored.  In the 
1891 election in Varese, a letter signed 'un esercente' was sent to the moderate 
newspaper Cronaca Prealpina complaining that the democratic list contained only 
professionals such as doctors, engineers, lawyers and notaries.  The Cronaca replied 
that it recognised the right of the esercenti to a voice but 'being as the best part of 
them are tied up with (their) affairs', perhaps they should be represented by an 
industrialist27.  Traders responded by running their own, autonomous, list, even 
though it was inevitably unsuccessful.   
This strong sense of a common identity deriving from occupation was usually  
described by petit-bourgeois publications as being 'economic' as distinct from 
'political' in nature.  This had important implications for the petite bourgeoisie's 
relationship with the city, and, in particular, its governance. Their attitude was 
summed up in the Monza bulletin's justification for recommending a list of candidates 
at elections: 
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he who contributes, with good money, to sustain the spending of the Comune has the 
right to enter into the administration of public business28. 
 
The telling terms here are administration and public business (pubblica 
azienda), which is here used as a synonym for the municipality.  The municipality, 
and the way that it should be run, were conceived in 'economic' terms - the council 
should 'administer' the city, not become the forum for political projects and quarrels. 
Note also that the reason the esercenti had a right to have their interests taken into 
account in this administration because they were taxpayers, contributors to the city 
enterprise.  Citizenship, therefore, was equated with taxpaying, not residence.  This 
had important implications for the broader social identity of the petite bourgeoisie. 
 During the nineteenth century, as we have already seen in Milan, social 
solidarities primarily revolved around the dazio consumo which was described by the 
Monza consorzio as 'one of the most odious taxes which the art of fleecing the people 
has yet devised’ because it hit the poor especially hard by increasing the prices of 
primary articles of consumption, and consequently reduced the volume of trade and 
the earnings of the esercenti29.  This reinforced the close identification between 
traders and their clientele that was articulated in alliances representing the popular 
classes revolving around abolition of the dazio.  In Varese in 1889 a list appealing to 
'esercenti, negozianti ed operai' - i.e. small business proprietors, traders and workers – 
was formed that hinged on an agreement to remove the dazio consumo from basic 
goods, the opening of public contracts to cooperatives, and the provision of training 
schools to train workers in arts and crafts30. 
 This was an unequal relationship, however, in which the enfranchised 
esercenti spoke up for their non-voting clients, rather than campaigning alongside 
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them as equals.  The 'esercente' who criticised the absence of traders on the 
Democratic list in Varese in 1891, dismissed the demands of another letter writer who 
signed himself a 'nullatenente'  - that is a 'have not' owning no property - for greater 
consideration.  According to the ‘esercente’ he was 
 
asserting the privileges of a class who pay taxes and which therefore has the right to 
vote directly for the town council, while the nullatenente wants to see represented a 
class whose rights are relative31. 
 
When the nullatenenti began helping themselves in ways that threatened to 
deprive the petit-bourgeoisie of their custom, such as the constitution of tax-exempt 
cooperative soup kitchens in Monza, the consorzio cautioned that ‘while we are not 
opposed to these useful institutions, nonetheless we cannot allow them to damage the 
esercenti in small commerce’32.  
 These frictions intensified significantly after the end of the century leading to 
an increasing sense of a social separation between small traders and their working 
class customers.  The local franchise introduced in 1888 had initially privileged the 
petite bourgeoisie, but this advantage was gradually eroded as the spread of education 
and industrial wages enfranchised workers, enabling parties whose appeal was 
fundamentally to the popular classes to increase their representation within the 
comuni and form centre-left coalition administrations such as that of 1899 to 1904 in 
Milan33.  Giolitti’s more liberal approach to industrial relations meant that many small 
businesses found themselves caught up in industrial disputes with their workers, often 
organised through the chambers of labour, while the increasing scope allowed to local 
authorities to extend their activities through measures such as municipalisation 
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(formally approved by parliament in 1903) allowed popular parties, notably the 
Socialists and the progressive Catholics,  to implement a series of measures which 
favoured particular groups of residents, rather than investing in the kinds of 
infrastructure improvements sought by city businesses.   
 The resultant tensions were captured in the Cremonese journal of 1910 when it 
adopted the figure of Pantaloon, the merchant character in commedia dell'arte, to 
represent the social groups with which its readers identified. 
 
The Pantaloon of today is not the same of that of 30 years ago. 
Pantaloon then was a man of the people who paid up and kept quiet: he couldn't 
therefore be confused with the worker of today, whose economic conditions 
continually improve because salaries today rise in step with the work of legislators 
designed to exempt the worker from each and every tax. 
For them healthy and cheap housing is erected, for them cooperatives supported by 
aid and privileges are set up, for them there are maternity rooms and institutes for 
suckling babies, children's and adult hospitals, free medicines, kindergartens, schools, 
meals, recreation centres, clothes, books, pictures, etc., etc.  Instead Pantaloon today 
is  represented, in the broadest sense of the word, by the class of clerks and better still 
by the small businessman, by the trader, by the industrialists who the taxman 
considers as the army of those first in line, first in line that is to be inexorably 
squeezed down to the minimum necessary34. 
 
 The article suggests the abandonment of a conception of  the self-employed 
and workers as forming a single popular class, for one in which the key to the identity 
of Pantaloon is that he is a taxpayer, a trader a citizen, while the worker residents are 
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not only exempt from taxes but the beneficiaries of a whole host of unprofitable 
political initiatives in which the comune should not be engaged.  
 It was for these reasons the Federation explained that: 
 
we, apolitical people, want to set up a wise and active administration ... so that 
political contests cease, so that one will have a true administration concerned only 
with the good of the citizen35. 
 
It believed that ‘by entering the town council in good numbers, we will put an end to 
this poisonous struggle that paralyses the best energies, the best initiatives’36.  This 
explains the apparent paradox that an article asking 'commercial electors .. .do you 
want ELECTRIC TRAMS? Do you want the railway question resolved? Vote for our 
list!' should be headlined with the leading slogan of the association: 'Down with 
politics37! 
 The Federation's list was unsuccessful in the elections of this year, and it 
admitted that it had yet to fully interpret the sentiments of its constituency.  We 
should be careful therefore about regarding this highly political 'apolitical' vision as 
representative of all petit-bourgeois opinion; rather it was a manifesto produced to in 
attempt to build a platform around which the business interests within the city could 
unite.  Yet in its labelling of these groups as 'the true working force of our city' and its 
call to reject 'politics and the ideals relating to it'  and install an administration of 
‘'those who know, those who can, those who can do'  to implement 'all those 
initiatives that could bring benefit and real advantage to our city which lives by 
work38', it foreshadowed many of the themes that dominated petit-bourgeois discourse 
concerning the politics of the city in the crisis years following the First World War. 
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 Reclaiming the City.  The Petite Bourgeoisie in the Immediate Post-war Era. 
 
It is not the intention of this article to analyse the experience of the petite 
bourgeoisie during the post-war era, but rather to demonstrate how the ways of 
thinking about the relationship between traders and the city that we saw develop in the 
pre-war period informed responses to the crisis years of 1918-192239.  It is noticeable  
that in justifying their positions during this period, petit-bourgeois associations 
continued to insist on the distinction we have seen developed between ‘political’ and 
‘economic’ activities, both in terms of asserting their own common interests, and as 
regards the administration of the city by the comuni .   
The outbreak of the First World War dramatically altered the nature of the 
commercial environment in which traders operated as the state increasingly 
intervened in the economy in order to control food supplies to its citizens  The most 
important manifestation of this was in 1916 with the introduction of price controls 
(calmieri) on a variety of staple goods, combined with various forms of rationing of 
supplies40.  Many traders were prosecuted for contravening the complex and 
frequently changing regulations governing the system, leading to claims the 
government was effectively ‘criminalising’ the commercial classes.  Social tensions 
were further exacerbated by rising inflation and reached their height with the ‘cost of 
living’ riots that swept through Italian cities in 191941.  Not only did the forces of law 
and order appear reluctant to protect commercial premises from this onslaught, the 
state subsequently refused to compensate shopkeepers for their losses and instituted 
further price controls that appeared to respond to the rioters’ demands.    
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The political character of the city had also changed.  The franchise reforms of 
1912 and 1918 resulted in the introduction of virtual universal manhood suffrage, 
enabling parties with a mass electorate, such as the Socialists, to win outright control 
over many cities.  These administrations introduced their own calmieri well prior to 
action being taken by the state, while the  operation of the national controls was also 
devolved to local authorities and commissions drawn from local representatives   
Many city administrations also set up so-called aziende consorziali di consumi, bulk 
purchasing agencies, which supplied goods to non-profit outlets, including consumer 
cooperatives, in order to keep prices in check:  in some cases, such as those of Milan 
and Rome, the aziende went as far as setting up their own distribution outlets.   The 
Milanese mayor Caldara made clear that he saw this as a first step towards the total 
suppression of the private sector42.  Consequently taxpayers were subsidising 
municipal ventures that were often run at a loss, and which, furthermore, directly 
damaged the interests of traders. The city seemed to be setting itself up in direct 
competition with its shop-keeping citizens. 
Traders sought to reclaim the city for themselves by restoring freedom of trade 
and restricting the comuni to their  purely 'administrative' functions.  However, the 
ways in which this task was approached again varied between cities.   In Rome, the 
Società generale fra negozianti ed industriali once more concluded the most effective 
approach lay in a national political campaign to abolish the state-created institutions 
of the wartime economy, and set up a new Confederazione generale del commercio 
italiano through which to pursue this.  Although its rhetoric stressed its lack of ties to 
political parties, the Confederation leader Ercole Cartoni entered politics himself, first 
standing as a free market Liberal in the 1921 parliamentary elections  and then 
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moving the Confederazione towards the Fascists in 1922 when they began advocating 
deregulation of the economy 43.   
Cartoni’s actions were condemned by a new association of Roman small 
traders, one catering specifically to the more marginal elements of the self-employed, 
particularly those who rented, as opposed to owned, their premises.  In 1921, it too 
established a national confederation, the Confederazione Nazionale Piccoli Industriali, 
Commercianti ed Esercenti (PICE).  The key word here was piccoli as this 
Confederation confined its constituency to the petite bourgeoisie alone, in clear 
contrast to the attempt to unite all forms of commercial interests in the manner 
practised by the Confederazione generale del commercio44.   
Much of the philosophy of PICE echoed that which we saw expressed by 
esercenti organisations in the pre-war era, notably an emphasis on the idea that what 
united traders was not a ‘political’, but an ‘economic’ interest.  They wished to remain 
aloof from participation in politics ‘otherwise we will have, as previously, the 
monarchist esercente, the socialist esercente, the clerical esercente, the republican 
esercente, but not the esercente organised in defence of his own interests’45.  
Proclaiming that the government of public affairs should not pertain to one or another 
political faction but to all social classes, the PICE offered its support to politicians of 
any colour who actions favoured their programme as summed up in the slogan 
‘Liberty, Order, Economy, Work’46.  This too recalled the pre-war practice of 
endorsing mixed lists of candidates believed to be favourable to commercial causes. 
The Milanese esercenti organisations again abstained from participating in 
these new national associations.  They were hesitant to link themselves to particular 
political parties, instead seeking to force the Comune to close down the Azienda 
consorziale di consumi, to loosen its price controls, and to withdraw from activities 
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such as running the municipal slaughterhouse47.  These demands were highly city-
focussed, and evidently constituted an attempt to reign in the Comune’s activities that 
was consistent with the emphasis placed on the need to restrict local authorities to 
their ‘administrative’ functions. 
Yet these demands could hardly be seen as other than political in that they put 
traders squarely in opposition to the Socialist administration.  In 1920 the various 
elements of the esercenti movement all endorsed the multi-party list coalition known 
as the Blocca Azione e Difesa Sociale in a two horse race against the Socialists.  
However, at national elections, Milan’s esercenti movement was split with the 
Federazione degli Esercenti’s decision to endorse ‘democratic’ lists being contested 
by the newspaper L’Esercente which argued against the principle of endorsement of a 
single political group when there were both ‘catholic’ and ‘lay’ esercenti, while also 
despairing that none of the parties seemed likely to deliver a return to the deregulated 
economy desired by small traders.  The paper went as far as to suggest that it might be 
necessary to use extra-legal measures to overthrow the government’s provisioning 
regime, and pronounced that ‘the moment has arrived in which inertia represents the 
major danger’48.  Significantly, the trigger for this despair was not the national 
political situation, but the victory of the maximalist Socialists in the local elections of 
October 1920.    
In August 1922, the city council was indeed overthrown as a result of direct 
action when the occupation of the town hall by the Fascists prompted the dismissal of 
the Socialist administration by the Prefect.  This apparent victory attracted little 
coverage in the city’s shopkeeper press, however.  It would seem that the leaders of 
the Milanese esercenti associations continued to believe that while there were 
common ‘economic’ and ‘administrative’ interests that united their members, it 
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remained necessary to respect the variety of political convictions of within them. 
Consequently although the overthrow of the administration was surely seen as 
satisfactory (and was certainly never condemned in the shopkeeper press), the fact it 
was predicated on Fascist activity meant it was largely ignored.  Even when there 
were clear links between traders’ activities and those of the Fascists, this remained the 
case.  The key role of the Fascist syndicates in defeating a bakery workers’ strike in 
the city in 1922, for example, was similarly played down  - even by those bakers’ 
leaders who were themselves close to the Fascist movement.   
 This was also the case in instances where the overthrow of a local council was 
the direct consequence of action taken by traders in conjunction with the Fascists.  
One such case occurred in provincial Lombardy where a new association  for 
Esercenti e Commercianti was set up in Treviglio in 1920, attracting a membership of 
169 from around 600 proprietors in the town.  Its journal demonstrates how the 
'apolitical' vision of politics developed in the pre-war period could lead to direct 
confrontation with the council itself.  Looking towards the local elections of 1920, it 
observed that: 
 
the Executive has always remained aloof from political discussions, convinced that if 
politics were ever to raise its head, it would signal the beginning of the dissolution of 
our Association. 
That said it is easy to demonstrate that with regard to the coming local elections the 
Association cannot remain inactive if, finally, that fatal form of politics, which has 
hindered all good work by previous administrations, is to be overthrown at the 
elections themselves. 
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What must now triumph is the principal that the local administration must have as its 
principal goal, the good management of public affairs without distinction of party or 
person.   
The town council, which has assumed the duty of administering the Comune on the 
basis of a precise economic programme, must be truly representative of all social 
classes (original italics)49.  
 
By arguing that the council had breached what the esercenti regarded as its 
moral obligation to administer the city as an economic resource in an apolitical 
manner, the Association justified political action in order to restore this ‘apolitical’ 
approach. It therefore urged its members to avert the 'disastrous spread of the red or 
white Bolshevik tide' by supporting an 'economic' list, composed of representatives of 
the 'parties of order' who 'had at their heart the well-being and development of our 
city, and intend to dedicate themselves to the not inconsiderable burden of 
administering the public patrimony'50.  
 The list failed to attract much support, however, leaving the Association 
bemoaning the dangers posed by  both red and black extremism - presumably a 
reference to the Fascist squads.  Unable to control the comune through the ballot box, 
the association began a new direct protest by refusing to pay local taxes from 
November 1921.  The end result of this protest was the dissolution of the council by 
the state authorities and its replacement by a Royal Commissioner in January 1923 - 
that is after the installation of Mussolini as Prime Minister.  Reflecting on these 
events in his annual report shortly afterwards, the Association's secretary explained 
that: 
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the very character of our Association demands that it takes up without hesitation the 
interests of our adherents, and because, for us, the hole in the council budget that was 
growing larger every day appeared dangerous as it would then have to be filled at our 
expense through hard sacrifices, the key element which decided us upon our actions 
was our clear aversion to the systems adopted by the men composing the Council 
executive in the conduct of all affairs of ordinary and extraordinary administration. .. 
finally through new ideas, changes in the government authorities, the re-emergence of 
a sense of economy and justice, and eventually via valid collaboration, we obtained 
the 'liquidation' of an absolutely inadequate administration that was leading us to 
ruin51.  
 
The logic of this position was that the threat to the interests of the taxpayer ‘citizens’ 
posed by the maladministration of the shared asset of the city outweighed any need to 
respect the democratic wishes of its residents.  Collaboration with agencies capable of 
reclaiming the city for its citizens was therefore valid. 
 The actions of the Treviglio association were far from unique in either 
approach or outcome.  In Lovere, for example, a town situated at the head of Lago 
d'Iseo, traders organised a strike against the high sales taxes imposed by the Socialist 
administration, again leading to the dissolution of the authority in early 192352. 
Of course, these victories were only possible because of the change in the political 
climate following the success of Fascism.  In Lovere, the traders actively sought the 
support of the Fascists, while in Treviglio it is clear that some prominent figures in the 
Association were also involved in the Fascist movement.  Yet this role was never 
acknowledged in the trader publications.  To have done so would have contradicted 
the doctrines that lay at the heart of esercenti identity: that what united them was their 
 28
economic interest as traders and taxpayers in the common location of the city, rather 
than their political convictions. 
 Instead the 'apolitical' Associazione degli Esercenti e Commercianti in 
Treviglio declared that the dissolution of the town council left it  with: 
 
the profound satisfaction of having carried out our duty to the benefit of the class that 
we represent and of all Trevigliese taxpayers, to whom, in this emergency situation, 
our association appeared to be the best defence of citizens' interests53. 
 
 This statement, and the circumstances in which it was issued, confirm the 
evolution of petit-bourgeois thinking about the city that this article has sought to trace.  
The city was the focus around which small traders sought to construct a common 
identity.  The forms and content of this identity might differ according to the context 
of the local commercial environment as the cases of Milan and Rome well 
demonstrate.  Similarly the pattern of shifting social solidarities points to the ways in 
which changes over time within the context of the same city might affect trader 
identities.  What remained consistent, however, as the evidence from pre- and post-
war Lombardy makes clear, was the emphasis placed on the need for the sound 
‘economic administration’ of the city through investment into modernisation projects 
to improve the returns it generated.   
 The city  was seen as a shared resource, an enterprise in which the petite 
bourgeoisie  had a double stake as traders and taxpayers.  It  needed to be nurtured 
through sound administration, rather than become an arena for political projects 
favouring one social group over another.  Even after the extensions of the franchise, 
this philosophy continued to distinguish between ‘citizens’ – in effect those who 
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contributed to the city through their business activities and their taxes - and other 
residents who lived from the work created by such ‘citizens’ and were net  
beneficiaries of the municipality’s interventions into the market.  Ultimately the 
interests of the former should be privileged over those of the latter, rather than vice 
versa, as had appeared to be the case to traders in the post-war era.   
Consequently, while the petit-bourgeois associations presented traders’ 
concern with the city as ‘apolitical’ – respecting the variety of ‘political’ identities 
that individual proprietors might assume – it could also become ‘supra-political’ in 
that the defence of the city as an economic resource (and with it the interests of its 
‘citizens’) was implicitly privileged over respect for the democratically expressed 
wishes of its residents.  Through their desire to reclaim the city in the post-war era, 
traders associations’ contributed, wittingly or otherwise, to the highly ‘political’ 
projects that served to destabilise the Italian state. 
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